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COMMENT
VALLEY FORGE CHRISTIAN COLLEGE v. AMERICANS
UNITED FOR SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE,
INC.: CITIZEN AND TAXPAYER STANDING UNDER THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE REVISITED
BRADLEY M. BOLE
Under authority of the Federal Property and Administrative Ser-
vices Act of 1949,1 at least $25.7 million worth of government sur-
plus property2 has been transferred to religious organizations at
minimal or no charge.3
In 1976, the transfer of a seventy-seven-acre tract valued at $1.3
million 4 to Valley Forge Christian College, a sectarian institution
operated by the Assemblies of God, caught the attention of Ameri-
cans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., a non-profit
organization avowedly dedicated to religious liberty and the consti-
tutional principle of separation of church and state. The organiza-
tion and four of its members filed suit in the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief to void the transfer as violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause of the first amendment.5
The district court granted the college's motion for summary
1. 40 U.S.C. §§ 471-544 (1976 & Supp. III 1979).
2. Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. United States Dep't of
Health, Education and Welfare, 619 F.2d 252, 254 (3d Cir. 1980), cert. granted, 450 U.S. 909
(1981). The property was originally acquired by the government at a cost of $64.5 million.
Id. The government did not join the petition for certiorari. Valley Forge Christian College v.
Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc., 450 U.S. 909 (1981). The Su-
preme Court reversed under this title at 102 S. Ct. 752 (1982). This comment refers to the
case as Americans United.
3. The Act authorizes the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare to sell or lease the
property to nonprofit, tax-exempt educational institutions for consideration that takes into
account "any benefit which has accrued or may accrue to the United States" from the trans-
feree's use of the property. 40 U.S.C. § 484(k)(1)(A), (C) (1976 & Supp. III 1979). By regula-
tion, the Secretary can reduce the price of the surplus property by a "public benefit allow-
ance" based on the "benefits to the United States from the use of such property for
educational purposes." 34 C.F.R. § 12.9(a) (1981). As a matter of practice, the Secretary
generally grants a public benefit allowance equal to 95-100% of the cost. Valley Forge Chris-
tian College was awarded a 100% allowance which permitted it to acquire the property free
of charge. 102 S. Ct. at 756.
4. 619 F.2d at 253.
5. 102 S. Ct. at 756-57. The Establishment Clause provides: "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion .... U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
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judgment and dismissed the complaint on the grounds that Ameri-
cans United failed to satisfy the two-pronged test for taxpayer
standing to sue previously announced by the Supreme Court in
Flast v. Cohen.6 Under that test, plaintiffs asserting only their sta-
tus as taxpayers are limited to challenging congressional enact-
ments under the Taxing and Spending Clause7 that exceed specific
constitutional limitations on the clause.' Because the Federal
Property and Administrative Services Act of 1949 was enacted
under the Property Clause,9 rather than the Taxing and Spending
Clause, the court concluded Americans United failed the Flast
test.
The district court also found Americans United had "failed to
allege that they have suffered any actual or concrete injury beyond
a generalized grievance common to all taxpayers." 10 This finding,
apparently unnecessary because Americans United failed the Flast
test for taxpayer standing, reiterates several of the key points of
the standing doctrine as it currently is defined by the Supreme
Court.
The Court interprets the article III "Cases" and "Controversies"
limitation to federal court jurisdiction" as requiring plaintiffs to
allege a concrete or specific injury as a threshold requirement for
standing to sue. The Court has stated such an injury assures "that
the questions will be framed with the necessary specificity, that the
issues will be contested with the necessary adverseness and that
the litigation will be pursued with the necessary vigor"' 2 to present
a "Case" or "Controversy." The Court also requires that the injury
6. 392 U.S. 83 (1968), cited at 102 S. Ct. at 757.
7. The Taxing and Spending Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power to lay
and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the com-
mon Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
8. 392 U.S. at 102-03. See infra notes 75-79 and accompanying text.
9. 102 S. Ct. at 762. The Property Clause provides: "The Congress shall have Power to
dispose of... Property belonging to the United States .... U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
10. 102 S. Ct. at 757.
11. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under
this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which
shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other
public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdic-
tion;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party;-to Contro-
versies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of another
State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the same State
claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citi-
zens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
12. 392 U.S. at 106.
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be individual or personal, rather than "generalized grievances
about the conduct of government or the allocation of power in the
Federal System."1 3
I. THE THIRD CIRCUIT AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS A
"PERSONAL" CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit agreed that Ameri-
cans United lacked standing as taxpayers under Flast, 4 but found
that the Establishment Clause arguably "creates in each citizen a
'personal constitutional right' to a government that does not estab-
lish religion. '15
By giving every individual a personal interest in the Establish-
ment Clause, the Third Circuit was able to bring Americans
United within the scope of prior challenges brought under the Es-
tablishment Clause in which standing was allowed where plaintiffs
could show they were "directly affected" 6 by alleged infringements
of the constitutional guarantee. More importantly, the finding ena-
bled the Third Circuit to skirt two major standing cases: United
States v. Richardson17 and Schlesinger v. Reservists Committee to
Stop the War.'8 Both cases concluded that citizens seeking to force
government to obey the mandates of its Constitution were assert-
ing only generalized rather than individualized injuries.
In Richardson, a taxpayer plaintiff claimed that the executive
branch's refusal to reveal expenditures of the Central Intelligence
Agency violated the Statement and Accounts Clause' of the Con-
stitution and hindered his ability to make informed decisions as a
voter.2 0 In Schlesinger, taxpayer and citizen plaintiffs alleged that
13. Id.
14. 619 F.2d at 260. For a discussion of the Third Circuit's treatment of this case, see
Comment, Americans United for Separation of Church and State, Inc. v. HEW: Standing
to Sue Under the Establishment Clause, 32 HASTINGS L.J. 975 (1981).
15. 619 F.2d at 265.
16. E.g., School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 n.9
(1963). See infra notes 84-87 and accompanying text.
17. 418 U.S. 166 (1974). For a discussion of Richardson and its companion case, Schles-
inger v. Reservists Comm. to Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208 (1974), see The Supreme Court,
1973 Term-Foreword: On Presidential Privilege, 88 HARV. L. REV. 41, 236-43 (1974); Com-
ment, Recent Standing Cases and a Possible Alternative Approach, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 213
(1975).
18. 418 U.S. 208 (1974).
19. The Statements and Accounts Clause provides: "[A] regular Statement and Account
of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time."
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 17.
20. 418 U.S. at 168-69, 176.
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a Pentagon policy allowing congressmen to retain their commis-
sions in the Armed Forces Reserves violated the Constitution's In-
compatibility Clause 21 and potentially allowed the executive de-
partment to exert undue influence on congressmen holding
commissions.2
In both cases, the Flast test was mechanically applied and the
plaintiffs were found to have failed to establish standing because
they were not challenging congressional enactments under the
Taxing and Spending Clause and the constitutional clauses under
which the suits had been brought were not specific limitations to
the taxing and spending power. 23 The Court, however, went further
and denied standing to the plaintiffs as citizens seeking to enforce
the Constitution on the grounds that their asserted injuries were
common to all members of the public and reflected only genera-
lized interests in constitutional governance too "abstract"24 to en-
sure concrete adversity.
The Third Circuit distinguished Richardson and Schlesinger
from Americans United on the basis of the constitutional clauses
underlying the claims in the three cases. The court found the
plaintiffs in Richardson and Schlesinger had based their chal-
lenges on only "general" limitations to governmental conduct, 2
and concluded "that the [Supreme] Court's consistent refusal to
grant 'citizen standing' to ideological plaintiffs seeking to litigate
the public interest has turned as much on the inadequacy of the
alleged interest sought to be protected as it has on the deficiency
of the injury alleged. 26
Relying on its own prior conclusion that "each citizen has a per-
sonal stake in ensuring that the Government not establish a relig-
21. The Incompatibility Clause provides: "No Senator or Representative shall, during
the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of
the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have
been encreased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States,
shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 6,
cl. 2.
22. 418 U.S. at 212.
23. 418 U.S. at 175; 418 U.S. at 217-22.
24. 418 U.S. at 175; 418 U.S. at 217.
25. 619 F.2d at 262-63, 265.
26. Id. at 263. Support for this construction was found in the Supreme Court's comment
in Richardson that it was "open to serious question whether the Framers of the Constitu-
tion ever imagined that general directives to the Congress or the Executive would be subject
to enforcement by an individual citizen." 418 U.S. at 178 n.11. Further support is the
Court's statement in Schlesinger that because of the nonspecific nature of the Incompatibil-
ity Clause "it can be only a matter of speculation whether the claimed violation has caused
concrete injury to the particular complainant." 418 U.S. at 223.
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ion '27 and the proposition that "[t]he underlying justification for
according standing in Flast . . . was the implicit recognition that
the Establishment Clause does create in every citizen a personal
constitutional right, ' 28 the court reasoned Americans United had
asserted "a particular and concrete injury to a right that is alleg-
edly protected by the constitutional guarantee raised" and there-
fore had standing.29
In a concurring opinion, it also was argued that since the Estab-
lishment Clause and first amendment were created to protect mi-
norities from the excesses of political majorities, citizens had a
right to rely on the judiciary, rather than the political process, to
enforce these protections."0 Since Americans United appeared ca-
pable of presenting the issues raised by the case and no better
plaintiffs appeared to be available to vindicate the Establishment
Clause rights involved, the concurring judge endorsed standing for
the organization. sl
II. THE SUPREME COURT: RIGID APPLICATION OF Flast AND A
HARD LINE ON CITIZEN STANDING REAFFIRMED
The Supreme Court granted certiorari 2 and voted 5-4 to reverse
the Third Circuit after concluding Americans United lacked stand-
ing. 3 The majority rigidly applied the Flast test for taxpayer
standing and concluded Americans United failed the first prong of
the test for two reasons: (1) The transfer was not a congressional
decision, but rather a decision by the Department of Health, Edu-
27. 619 F.2d at 262 (footnote omitted). The Third Circuit found further support for this
distinction between specific constitutional rights and general constitutional limitations in
three other cases in which the Supreme Court seemingly found standing on the basis of
asserted injuries to plaintiff's fundamental rights. These were Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186
(1962), in which standing was allowed for an alleged injury to plaintiff's right to vote; School
Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), in which standing was
granted for an asserted injury to the plaintiff's individual right under the Establishment
Clause; and Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970), in which the
Supreme Court stated "a spiritual stake in First Amendment values [is] sufficient to give
standing to raise issues concerning the Establishment Clause." Id. at 154.
28. 619 F.2d at 262.
29. Id. at 265.
30. Id. at 266 (Rosenn, J., concurring). Support for this argument was found in the Su-
preme Court's liberalized standing rules allowing plaintiffs whose conduct was permissibly
regulated to raise the claims of injured parties whose conduct was chilled by overbroad stat-
utes when challenging those statutes under the Free Speech Clause. See Broadrick v.
Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973).
31. 619 F.2d at 266.
32. 450 U.S. 909 (1981).
33. 102 S. Ct. at 767-68.
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cation and Welfare, and (2) authority for the transfer was derived
from Congress' power under the Property Clause, rather than the
Taxing and Spending Clause.3 4
The Court discounted the distinctions drawn by the Third Cir-
cuit between the challenge in Americans United and those in
Richardson and Schlesinger. Observing that the Incompatibility
Clause and Statement and Accounts Clause are no less fundamen-
tal than the Establishment Clause, the Court said:
Each establishes a norm of conduct which the federal government
is bound to honor-to no greater or lesser extent than any other
inscribed in the Constitution .... Moreover, we know of no
principled basis on which to create a hierarchy of constitutional
values or a complimentary "sliding scale" of standing which
might permit respondents to invoke the judicial power of the
United States. 5
Instead, the Court found that Americans United, like the plain-
tiffs in Richardson and Schlesinger, merely claimed that the Con-
stitution had been violated and alleged no personal injury "other
than the psychological consequence presumably produced by ob-
servation of conduct with which one disagrees." ' Concrete adver-
sity is guaranteed not by the intensity of plaintiffs' interest in en-
forcing constitutional rights, the Court added, but by the presence
of an actual individualized injury in fact.3 7
Joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, Justice Brennan dis-
sented and traced the history of the Establishment Clause as a
specific limitation on the levy and use of taxes, essentially agreeing
with the Third Circuit that there is a personal concrete injury
whenever this constitutional guarantee is violated.3 8
34. Id. at 762.
35. Id. at 764-65.
36. Id. at 765.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 773-78 (Brennan, J., dissenting). The dissenters also accused the majority of
using standing determinations to disguise decisions actually made on the merits of asserted
claims. Id. at 768. See also Tushnet, The New Law of Standing: A Plea for Abandonment,
62 CORNELL L. REV. 663 (1977).
The dissenters further contended the term "injury" takes on different meanings depend-
ing on the statutory or constitutional context in which it occurs. 102 S. Ct. at 769. After
tracing the history of the Establishment Clause, Justice Brennan concluded:
It may be that Congress can tax for almost any reason, or for no reason at all.
There is, so far as I have been able to discern, but one constitutionally imposed
limit on that authority. Congress cannot use tax money to support a church, or to
encourage religion. That is "the forbidden exaction." In absolute terms the history
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Noting that the Flast test was created to provide taxpayers with
an opportunity to challenge alleged violations of the Establishment
Clause, the dissenters argued that Americans United was practi-
cally indistinguishable from Flast. "It can make no constitutional
difference," Justice Brennan observed, that the Federal Property
and Administrative Services Act was enacted under authority of
the Property Clause rather than the Taxing and Spending
Clause. 9 The only practical difference between enactments under
the two clauses is the difference between the gift of a completed
facility and the gift of money to construct a facility, which Bren-
nan termed "a meaningless distinction. '40
The dissenters also argued the majority's distinction between the
Flast challenge to a congressional act and Americans United's
challenge to a decision by HEW was formalistic and insignificant.
Since the Flast challenge also was directed toward HEW imple-
mentation of a congressional enactment, Brennan suggested the
two cases could be reconciled by allowing Americans United to
amend its complaint to allege the Federal Property and Adminis-
trative Services Act was unconstitutional." Further, since virtually
all congressional enactments end up being implemented by officials
in the executive branch, the first amendment in this instance
"binds the Government as a whole, regardless of which branch is at
work in a particular instance. '42
III. CURRENT STANDING DOCTRINE
Prior to 1968, plaintiffs injured by governmental action were de-
of the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment makes this clear. History
also makes it clear that the federal taxpayer is a singularly "proper and appropri-
ate party to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction" to challenge a federal bestowal
of largesse as a violation of the Establishment Clause. Each, and indeed every,
federal taxpayer suffers precisely the injury that the Establishment Clause guards
against when the Federal Government directs that funds be taken from the pock-
etbooks of the citizenry and placed into the coffers of the ministry.
Id. at 778 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
39. Id. at 779.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 778.
42. Id. at 779. In a separate dissent, Justice Stevens endorsed the Brennan dissent,
agreeing that the Court has a more significant role to play in enforcing the Establishment
Clause than other norms of governmental behavior such as those involved in Richardson
and Schlesinger. Stevens also agreed "that the essential holding of Flast v. Cohen attaches
special importance to the Establishment Clause and does not permit the drawing of a tenu-
ous distinction between the Spending Clause and Property Clause." Id. at 781 (Stevens, J.,
dissenting).
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nied standing unless they could show the action invaded "a legal
right,-one of property, one arising out of contract, one protected
against tortious invasion, or one founded on a statute which con-
fers a privilege."'43 This legal interest test was abandoned in Asso-
ciation of Data Processing Service Organizations, Inc. v. Camp"
and Barlow v. Collins.45 It was replaced with a two-part test re-
quiring plaintiffs to show an "injury in fact, economic or other-
wise, '" 6 and that "the interest to be protected . .. is arguably
within the zone of interests sought to be protected or regulated by
the statute or constitutional guarantee in question. ' 47 The courts
43. Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S. 118, 137-38 (1939). See also K. DA-
vis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TEXT § 22.01 (3d ed. 1972). Professor Davis cites five examples of
pre-1968 cases in which standing was denied to plaintiffs adversely affected by governmen-
tal action which they sought to challenge: Tennessee Electric Power Co. v. TVA, 306 U.S.
118 (1939), in which eighteen power companies adversely affected by the government-oper-
ated Tennessee Valley Authority were denied standing to challenge the constitutionality of
the authority; Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113 (1940), in which steel companies
wishing to sell to the government were denied standing to challenge an allegedly unautho-
rized wage determination requirement; Atlanta v. Ickes, 308 U.S. 517 (1939), in which the
city was denied standing to challenge a minimum price order requiring it to pay increased
prices for coal; L. Singer & Sons v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 311 U.S. 295 (1940), in which
several plaintiffs constructing market facilities were denied standing to seek an injunction
against the unlawful construction of a rail extension serving a competitor; Frothingham v.
Mellon, 262 U.S. 447 (1923), in which a federal taxpayer was denied standing to challenge
allegedly unconstitutional expenditures under the Maternity Act of 1921. For additional dis-
cussion of Frothingham, see infra notes 69-71 and accompanying text. Davis cautions that
these cases are not typical of pre-1968 standing cases, but only of cases denying standing.
Id. at 421. He invites comparison with FCC v. Sanders Bros. Radio Station, 309 U.S. 470
(1940), allowing an established radio station to challenge the grant of a license to a new
competitor even though the station would have appeared to lack standing under existing
rules.
The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the law of standing is a "complicated spe-
cialty of federal jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any event more or less
determined by the specific circumstances of individual situations .. " United States ex
rel. Chapman v. Federal Power Comm., 345 U.S. 153, 156 (1953). The Court also has ob-
served that "[g]eneralizations about standing to sue are largely worthless as such." Associa-
tion of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 151 (1970).
For a defense of current standing doctrine, see Brilmayer, The Jurisprudence of Article
III: Perspectives on the "Case or Controversy" Requirement, 93 HAav. L. REv. 297 (1979).
Brilmayer believes standing doctrine serves three policies embodied in article III. The first
policy is judicial restraint to avoid undermining the doctrine of stare decisis through prema-
ture consideration or frequent reconsideration of issues. Id. at 302-06. The second policy
identified by Brilmayer is that of avoiding due process problems that would arise if unin-
jured plaintiffs were allowed to assert and thereby pre-empt the claims of injured plaintiffs.
Id. at 306-10. The third policy is that of safe-guarding the right of injured plaintiffs to
decide whether and when to vindicate their rights. Id. at 310-15.
44. 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
45. 397 U.S. 159 (1970).
46. 397 U.S. at 152.
47. Id. at 153.
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generally have not discussed the "zone of interest" portion of the
standing test 48 and have concentrated on defining or modifying the
"injury in fact" portion.
A complete statement of the doctrine as the Court currently per-
ceives it was recited by Justice Rehnquist writing for the majority
in Americans United:
The term "standing" subsumes a blend of constitutional require-
ments and prudential considerations ...and it has not always
been clear in the opinions of this Court whether particular fea-
tures of the "standing" requirement have been required by Arti-
cle III ex proprio vigore, or whether they are requirements that
the Court itself has erected and which were not compelled by the
language of the Constitution.4 9
Recent cases, Rehnquist found, indicate article III requires "at
an irreducible minimum" that a plaintiff allege: (1) "that he per-
sonally has suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of
the putatively illegal conduct of the defendant," 0 (2) that there is
some causal relationship between the conduct and the injury, 1 and
(3) that the injury "is likely to be redressed by a favorable
decision. ' '51
The requirement of a direct, redressable injury allows three poli-
cies embodied in article III to be served. First, it ensures that dis-
putes will be resolved, "not in the rarified atmosphere of a debat-
ing society, but in a concrete factual context conducive to a
realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.""s Sec-
ond, it allows the court to resolve disputes with some confidence
that all relevant facts are before it." Third, since a decision hold-
ing a legislative or executive act unconstitutional affects the rela-
tionships between co-equal branches of government, the injury re-
quirement guards against unwise or unnecessary judicial intrusion
into the activities of these other branches.55
Rehnquist concluded his analysis by noting that the court has
48. Davis, supra note 43, at § 22.07.
49. 102 S. Ct. at 758 (citations omitted).
50. Id., (citing Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979)).
51. 102 S. Ct. at 758 (citing Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 41 (1976)). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614 (1973).
52. 102 S. Ct. at 758 (quoting Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S.
26, 38, 41 (1976).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 759.
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further modified the doctrine for prudential, rather than constitu-
tional, reasons by: (1) restricting plaintiffs to asserting injuries only
to themselves and not to third parties," (2) refraining from adjudi-
cating "abstract questions of wide public significance" that amount
to "generalized grievances" 57 better left to resolution through the
political process, and (3) requiring that the complaint fall within
the zone of interests protected by the statute or constitutional
guarantee involved."
IV. THE INJURY IN FACT REQUIREMENT
Neither the requirement of an injury in fact nor the requirement
of standing in general are mentioned specifically in the Constitu-
tion. 9 The Court has asserted that standing has a historical basis
in the English judicial system and was adopted by implication by
the framers of the Constitution." Legal scholars, however, have
persuasively shown that uninjured plaintiffs were allowed to bring
a variety of actions in English courts challenging excesses in au-
thority in the Eighteenth Century and that modern American
standing doctrine essentially has been developed and adapted by
the Supreme Court.6'
Further, the Court has ignored or modified the doctrine in vari-
ous situations. For example, the Court has not limited the federal
courts to rendering judgments strictly within the context of adver-
sary proceedings in which one party alleges an injury, but instead
has allowed the courts to enter consent decrees, probate estates in
the District of Columbia and the territories, enjoin strikes for
eighty days, admit aliens, dispose of voluntary bankruptcy peti-
tions and accept guilty pleas when parties are in agreement.6 2
The injury-in-fact requirement also has proven to be flexible in
varying circumstances. For example, while the Court has applied
56. Id. at 759-60 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 499 (1975)).
57. 102 S. Ct. at 760 (citing 422 U.S. at 499-500); see also 418 U.S. 166 (1974); 418 U.S.
208 (1974) and Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
58. 102 S. Ct. at 760 (citing Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150,
153 (1970)).
59. See Berger, Standing to Sue in Public Actions: Is it a Constitutional Requirement?,
78 YALE L.J. 816, 818 (1969).
60. Id. at 816.
61. Id. at 818-27. Berger shows that the English judiciary allowed plaintiffs to bring a
variety of actions challenging excesses in authority without showing any injury to their per-
sonal interest. These included writs of prohibition, certiorari, mandamus, quo warranto and
relator actions.
62. Davis, Standing: Taxpayers and Others, 35 U. CHI. L. REv. 601, 607 (1968).
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the requirement strictly in constitutional challenges, it has been
generous in finding injuries for challenges based on statutory
rights. In United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory
Agency Procedures," standing was allowed under the then-existing
Administrative Procedures Act" to challenge an Interstate Com-
merce Commission surcharge on freight rates despite a highly spec-
ulative injury. The students alleged the surcharge might increase
the use of non-recyclable goods "thus resulting in the need to use
more natural resources to produce such goods, some of which re-
sources might be taken from the Washington area, and resulting in
more refuse that might be discarded in national parks in the
Washington area. '65
Congress has taken advantage of this relaxed view of injury in
statutory cases and has given standing to "any person" and "any
interested person" without specifying an injury requirement." The
Court, however, has indicated that there are some limits to this
expansion. In Sierra Club v. Morton,67 the Court acknowledged
that aesthetic, conservational and recreational injuries may be suf-
ficient to sustain standing, but then denied the Sierra Club stand-
ing to challenge a Department of Interior decision to construct a
ski resort adjacent to Sequoia National Park because the environ-
mental organization failed to allege any of its members used the
park and would be injured by the development.
Further, while the Court has refused to find asserted violations
of constitutional guarantees sufficient to allow standing, it has
agreed that minimal economic injuries are adequate to allow plain-
tiffs access to the federal courts.6
Of particular relevance to Americans United is the Court's ma-
63. 412 U.S. 669 (1973).
64. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (1966) (current version at 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. IV 1980)).
65. 412 U.S. at 688.
66. See Tushnet, supra note 38, at 666-67. The author cites the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1857-18571 (1970 & Supp. V 1975) (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7616 (Supp. IV
1980)), providing "any person may commence a civil action on his own behalf...." Id. at §
1857h-2(a)(2) (1970) (current version at § 7604(a) (Supp. IV 1980)), and the Federal Elec-
tions Campaign Act Amendments of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-443, 88 Stat. 1263 (amending
scattered sections of 2, 5, 18, 26, 47 U.S.C.), allowing any qualified voter to bring suit to test
the Act's constitutionality. See also Comment, supra note 14, at 978 n.18, citing congres-
sional acts giving standing to "any person" or "any interested person."
67. 405 U.S. 727 (1972).
68. See Davis, supra note 62, at 611-12, citing examples of standing granted on the basis
of trifling injuries. These include a fine of $5, McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961); a
poll tax of $1.50, Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966); and a fraction
of one vote, Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
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nipulation of the injury in fact requirement in the area of taxpayer
standing. In the seminal case of Frothingham v. Mellon, 9 the
Court announced an apparent absolute ban on taxpayer challenges
to governmental actions. In Frothingham, a taxpayer claimed the
Maternity Act of 1921, providing federal funds to states establish-
ing maternal and infant health programs, was a congressional inva-
sion of powers reserved to the states by the tenth amendment. The
effect of this unconstitutional act, she claimed, would be to in-
crease her future federal tax burden and "thereby take her prop-
erty without due process of law."' 70 The Court found that a tax-
payer's interest in the federal treasury was shared by millions of
others and therefore "comparatively minute and indeterminable"
and that the program's effect on her future taxes was "remote,
fluctuating and uncertain."'1 Because of this, the Court concluded
the taxpayer had not shown a "direct" injury sufficient to sustain
standing.
Commentators and the Court found the result in Frothingham
unsatisfactory for several reasons. The Court's suggestion that a
federal taxpayer's bill was too minute to give rise to a substantial
injury was both inaccurate and inconsistent with prior decisions
allowing challenges based on a municipal taxpayer's interest in a
city's treasury. 72
More importantly, the logical implication of the Frothingham
holding was the unacceptable proposition that "if illegal action
raises the amounts that all taxpayers must pay, no one has stand-
ing to challenge the action. 7' This barrier became particularly
troublesome in the 1960's when Congress began to consider provid-
ing federal aid to schools sponsored by religious organizations.
Since a Supreme Court decision on the propriety of such aid would
affect Congress's willingness to provide it, groups favoring and op-
posed to the idea and Congress itself were eager to provide a mech-
anism for challenging constitutionality of an act providing financial
aid.7'
In Flast,75 the Court obliged by dropping the Frothingham bar-
69. 262 U.S. 447 (1923).
70. Id. at 486.
71. Id. at 487.
72. Id. at 486. In Flast the Court acknowledged the weakness of this rationale. 392 U.S.
at 93-94.
73. Davis, supra note 43, at § 22.01.
74. C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 13 (3d ed. 1976).
75. 392 U.S. 83.
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rier to allow taxpayer suits based on the Establishment Clause.
Here, taxpayers challenged the use of tax money to provide in-
struction and materials at religious schools through the Elemen-
tary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, alleging the expendi-
tures violated the Establishment and Free Exercise Clauses of the
first amendment. The Court found article III itself did not bar tax-
payer suits if the taxpayers could demonstrate a sufficient personal
stake in the outcome.7 6 To determine the circumstances in which a
taxpayer could demonstrate "the personal stake and interest that
impart the necessary concrete adverseness" required by article III,
the Court promulgated its two-prong nexus test:
First, the taxpayer must establish a logical link between that sta-
tus and the type of legislative enactment attacked. Thus, a tax-
payer will be a proper party to allege the unconstitutionality only
of exercises of congressional power under the taxing and spending
clause of Art. I, § 8, of the Constitution. It will not be sufficient to
allege an incidental expenditure of tax funds in the administra-
tion of an essentially regulatory statute .... Secondly, the tax-
payer must establish a nexus between that status and the precise
nature of the constitutional infringement alleged. Under this re-
quirement, the taxpayer must show that the challenged enact-
ment exceeds specific constitutional limitations imposed upon the
exercise of the congressional taxing and spending power and not
simply that the enactment is generally beyond the powers dele-
gated to Congress by Art. I, § 8.7
The Court then found that the Establishment Clause "operates
as a specific constitutional limitation upon the exercise by Con-
gress of the taxing and spending power conferred by Art. I, § 8. ''1 8
This conclusion was reached after a brief historical analysis of the
clause which the Court found "vividly illustrates that one of the
specific evils feared by those who drafted the Establishment
Clause and fought for its adoption was that the taxing and spend-
ing power would be used to favor one religion over another or to
support religion in general.7 9
76. Id. at 85-86, 101.
77. Id. at 102-03. For discussions of the Flast nexus test, see Bogen, Standing Up for
Flast: Taxpayer and Citizen Standing to Raise Constitutional Issues, 67 Ky. L.J. 147
(1978-79).
78. 392 U.S. at 104.
79. Id. at 103.
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V. FINDING THE INJURY IN ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE CHALLENGES
Although the Court hinted it might be willing to further open
the Flast exception to Frothingham by agreeing to consider what
other clauses may be specific limits on the taxing and spending
power, 80 Americans United shows the exception is narrow and lim-
ited strictly to Flast situations.
The dissenters in Americans United are correct in noting that
the factual distinctions between this case and Flast are constitu-
tionally insignificant. The majority in Americans United did not
explain how a gift of land to aid a religious organization differs
from a gift of money, but instead mechanically applied Flast and
denied standing. As the dissenters suggest, the majority's unwill-
ingness to reconcile the two cases or expand the Flast test more
likely indicates an unwillingness to reach the merits of the claim
rather than fastidious concern with constitutional principle.8 2
The Court's strict application of the Flast test in Americans
United at least kept the Court from committing itself further to
the fiction that a plaintiff's interest in his tax bill guarantees con-
crete adversity in Establishment Clause challenges. The Court
failed, however, to recognize that the plaintiff's actual motive in
Establishment Clause challenges is to preserve the sanctity of the
constitutional guarantee itself.
In this sense, the Third Circuit was on the right track when it
sought to allow Establishment Clause challenges outside the tax-
payer context. By giving every citizen a personal interest in the
guarantee, an injury sufficient to sustain standing can be found any
time the clause is violated. More significantly, standing will be
found without regard to effect on the plaintiff's tax bill.83
The Supreme Court has allowed non-taxpayer challenges under
the clause, but because of the injury in fact requirement has lim-
80. Id. at 105.
81. One indication of how rigid the Flast exception has become can be found at 102 S.
Ct. 763, n. 17 in which Justice Rehnquist essentially performs a Frothingham analysis on
the Americans United problem. Because denying the land transfer to Valley Forge Chris-
tian College would have a speculative or nonexistent impact on tax burdens, he questions
whether Americans United would have standing even if it could meet the Flast test.
82. 102 S. Ct. at 768 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83. Although the Court in Flast did not specifically state whether the plaintiff's injury
was to his Establishment Clause right or to his tax bill, a pre-Flast case, Doremus v. Board
of Educ., 342 U.S. 429 (1952), suggests that the injury was to the plaintiff's tax liability. In
Doremus, taxpayers were denied standing to challenge Bible reading in public schools be-
cause the program did not cost money and plaintiffs could not show their challenge was "a
good-faith pocketbook action." Id. at 434.
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ited such challenges primarily to plaintiffs who can show they are
"directly affected" by the government action.84 Thus, the Court
has found standing for parents and school children seeking to chal-
lenge various Bible reading and school prayer programs.85
In Engel v. Vitale,"' the Court went a little further and allowed
an Establishment Clause challenge to a school prayer program by
plaintiffs who suffered only indirect coercive pressure because the
specified prayer was non-denominational and students who did not
wish to recite it were excused or allowed to remain silent. The
Court did not discuss standing in Engel, but acknowledged "[t]he
Establishment Clause, unlike the Free Exercise Clause, does not
depend upon any showing of direct governmental compulsion and
is violated by the enactment of laws which establish an official re-
ligion whether those laws operate directly to coerce nonobserving
individuals or not."8 Some commentators viewed this statement as
an easing of the injury requirement in non-taxpayer challenges
under the Establishment Clause cases, 8 but, as Americans United
shows, the requirement is still alive and well.
Thus, there is the necessity of identifying an injury in Ameri-
cans United. One commentator has suggested that owners of prop-
erty adjacent to the land transferred to Valley Forge Christian Col-
lege might have standing by alleging an injury to their "beneficial
interest in the public use of land."8 9 Support for this was found in
several lower court cases allowing standing to challenge religious
use of public property.90 Resort to this theory, however, simply
would promote another troublesome fiction. Like the taxpayer
standing test, the "beneficial interest" theory fails to recognize the
true concern of the plaintiff in vindicating the Establishment
Clause. In Americans United, Justice Rehnquist declared the pur-
pose of standing doctrine is to promote the policies of full and ad-
84. School Dist. of Abington Township, Pa. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. at 224 n.9.
85. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306, 309 n.4 (1952);
Illinois ex rel. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 206 (1948). See also Comment,
supra note 14, at 986-87.
86. 370 U.S. 421.
87. Id. at 430.
88. See Sutherland, Establishment According to Engel, 76 HARv. L. REv. 25, 27 (1962).
Kurland, The Regents' Prayer Case: "Full of Sound and Fury, Signifying...," 1962 Sup.
CT. REV. 1, 22.
89. Comment, supra note 14, at 988.
90. Anderson v. Salt Lake City Corp., 475 F.2d 29 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 879
(1973); Baird v. White, 476 F. Supp. 442 (D. Mass. 1979); Allen v. Hickel, 424 F.2d 944 (D.C.
Cir. 1970).
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verse resolution of issues embodied in article III1 If this is so,
then the "beneficial interest" theory presumes that adjacent land-
owners would raise the issues of Americans United more fully and
adversely than would a 90,000-member organization with financial
resources to pursue the case to the Supreme Court, experience in
Establishment Clause litigation and an avowed dedication to its
underlying principles.
This is, in fact, the primary criticism that commentators have
leveled against current standing doctrine: an injury in fact does not
necessarily guarantee concrete adversity or full resolution of the
issues.2 Rather, it has been argued:
[tihe most reliable indicia of motivation are litigation costs; and
this is particularly relevant where a plaintiff challenges a govern-
ment with virtually unlimited resources. Further, an issue is far
more likely to be sharply presented by a well-financed public in-
terest organization such as Sierra Club than by some bedraggled
hermit who lives in the wilds of Sequoia National Park.98
In its search for an injury in Americans United, the Third Cir-
cuit considered whether under current standing doctrine the only
plaintiff with sufficient injury to sue was "a nonsectarian educa-
tional institution that had actually applied for the award of gov-
ernment property in question, but lost out to the Valley Forge
Christian College. ' 94 The Third Circuit properly rejected this pro-
position, but for the wrong reason. The rejection would have been
proper for the reason just stated: it is unreasonable to assume un-
successful competitors for the land transfer would pursue the case
with greater thoroughness and adversity than would Americans
United.
The Third Circuit instead rejected the proposition on the basis
that the existence of a "better plaintiff" should not prohibit an
injured plaintiff from raising the issues. 5 This was made necessary
by the Supreme Court's elevation of injury-in-fact to a constitu-
tional prerequisite, in effect equating "better plaintiff" with "in-
jured plaintiff."
Thus, the Third Circuit was left with the problem of identifying
91. See supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
92. Comment, Standing to Sue in Federal Courts: The Elimination of Preliminary
Threshold Standing Inquiries, 51 TUL. L. REv. 119, 145 (1976).
93. Id. (Footnotes omitted).
94. 619 F.2d 263-64, n.72.
95. Id.
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an injury. This it resolved by suggesting a hierarchy of constitu-
tional rights that allowed the Establishment Clause to be desig-
nated "personal" so that even indirect infringements of it would
cause an injury sufficient to satisfy the Supreme Court.9" This reso-
lution was reasonable, but doomed to collapse of its own weight.
The concept of injury-in-fact simply has become so burdened with
the requirement of "concrete" injuries that non-coercive offenses
to the conscience simply did not fit into the Supreme Court
scheme.
VI. POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES TO STANDING DOCTRINE
The Supreme Court's decision in Americans United was predict-
able. Its rigid application of the Flast test and the denial of citizen
standing in the absence of a direct injury was not a surprise in
light of Richardson and Schlesinger. However, its result, denying
virtually anyone an opportunity to challenge the constitutionality
of a program that has substantially benefitted religious organiza-
tions at taxpayer expense, compels some reconsideration of the
value and effectiveness of the underlying doctrine.
Current standing rules seek to serve three constitutional princi-
ples: complete adversity, full resolution of the issues, and due re-
gard for co-equal branches of government. 97 As already noted, it is
at least questionable whether the Court's insistence in focusing on
the nature of a plaintiff's injury rather than taking a realistic view
of the circumstances surrounding the litigation guarantees adver-
sity or thoroughness.9"
It is also at least questionable whether the standing doctrine as
defined in Americans United has maintained the balance of power
between the judicial, executive and legislative branches of govern-
ment. The Supreme Court has acknowledged that the purposes of
the Establishment Clause and the Bill of Rights are to "withdraw
certain subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to
place them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to es-
tablish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts." 99 Yet,
those who seek to vindicate these constitutional protections are
turned away by the courts and left to contend with the political
process that authorized and approved the challenged transfer. As
96. Id. at 261-66.
97. 102 S. Ct. at 758-59, see supra notes 53-55 and accompanying text.
98. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
99. West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943).
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one commentator has noted:
Litigation that challenges unconstitutional legislation does not
constitute an "improper interference" with nor an "intrusion"
into the legislative domain. No authority to make laws in excess
of granted powers was "committed" to Congress; instead courts
were authorized to check Congressional excesses . . . .A legisla-
tive usurpation does not change character when it is challenged
by a stranger; and judicial restraint thereon remains a "judicial"
function, not an "intrusion," though undertaken at the call of one
without a personal stake.100
Any fears of intrusion into the legislative and executive branch
should be somewhat alleviated by the fact that judicial review in
situations similar to Americans United is directed only at the con-
stitutionality of legislative enactments, not their wisdom. In other
words, the court will review only after Congress has taken a posi-
tion on the matter and only for the purpose of determining
whether the enactment comports with the Constitution. The Court
is neither intruding on Congress's decision to address the matter
nor mandating the manner in which it should be addressed. Such a
review should not be considered offensive by either branch; it
merely reflects the proper checks and balances of our constitu-
tional system.10'
If current standing doctrine arguably does not serve any of the
purposes which the Court feels are embodied in article III, the next
question must be whether it serves any purpose at all. Commenta-
tors generally agree that standing inquiries are useful for another
purpose-reserving the case for the proper plaintiff and guarding
against an improper plaintiff.102 As stated earlier, the Supreme
Court essentially uses injury as its yardstick for determining who is
the "better plaintiff." There are, however, several possible alterna-
tives which can better serve the same purpose.
One alternative interpretation of standing proposed by Professor
Davis would greatly simplify the doctrine and slightly ease the in-
jury requirement. Under this formulation, designed primarily to
determine standing based on statutory provisions, but adaptable to
challenges based on constitutional provisions, "[a] person whose le-
gitimate interest is injured in fact or imminently threatened with
100. Berger, supra note 59, at 828-29.
101. Bogen, supra note 77, at 158-62.
102. Davis, supra note 43, at § 22.04.
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injury by governmental action should have standing to challenge
that action in absence of legislative intent that the interest is not
to be protected."103 The disadvantage of this proposal and other
alternatives proposed by Davis10 4 is that they continue to focus on
the requirement of an injury, 0 5 thereby promoting the dubious no-
tion that injury alone will identify the better plaintiff, guarantee
adversity, and full resolution of the issues. The advantage of the
proposal is that it gives an injured plaintiff standing without hav-
ing to prove legislative intent to allow the challenge. Instead, it
shifts the burden to the defendant, who must prove the plaintiff
lacks standing on the basis of legislative intent not to protect the
asserted interest.' This would make it easier for a plaintiff to
meet the injury requirement, thereby reducing the burden of prov-
ing standing. The proposal also simplifies standing rules by using
them strictly to identify the proper plaintiff and relying on other
doctrines to satisfy other prudential or constitutional concerns now
subsumed by standing doctrine. Professor Davis states:
The courts should avoid hypothetical or remote ques-
tions-through the law of ripeness, not through the law of stand-
ing. The courts should decline to enter political areas-through
the law of political questions, not through the law of standing.
The courts should limit themselves to issues "appropriate for ju-
dicial determination"-through the law of case or controversy,
not through that part of the law of case or controversy pertaining
to standing. The courts should avoid taking over functions of gov-
ernment that are committed to executives or administra-
tors-through the law of scope of review, not through the law of
standing. The courts should virtually stay away from some gov-
ernmental activities, such as foreign affairs and military opera-
tions-through the law of unreviewability, not through the law of
standing. The courts should insist upon competent presentation
of cases-through refusals to respond to inadequate presenta-
tions, not through the law of standing.107
103. Id. at 438. The Court has relaxed the injury requirement in challenges based on the
Administrative Procedures Act and other statutory provisions, arguably creating a separate
standing doctrine for cases not involving constitutional provisions. See supra notes 62-66
and accompanying text. However, Davis's proposed test can be adapted to constitutional
challenges by requiring examination of the intentions of the framers of the constitutional
provision involved. See infra notes 116-21 and accompanying text.
104. Davis, supra note 62, at 628-36 (listing 14 proposals for what standing doctrine
ought to be).
105. Davis, supra note 43, at § 22.08.
106. Id.
107. Id. at § 22.04.
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Another standing proposal urges the Court to abandon standing
as a threshold inquiry and require plaintiffs to prove injury, legis-
lative intent, causation and other elements of standing while liti-
gating their claims. 108 This proposal recognizes that, despite the
Supreme Court's protestations to the contrary, 10 9 standing deci-
sions usually are based on a preliminary evaluation of the merits.
Since this preliminary inquiry is likely to be incomplete and im-
pressionistic, the proposal moves it into the forum where the ele-
ments of a cause of action can be fully developed. If plaintiffs are
unable "to show something more than a vague concern for legal-
ity," the case would be dismissed. The advantage of this propo-
sal is the recognition that standing decisions usually are based on
the merits of a claim before the merits are adequately explored.
The disadvantage is that it simply moves the problems of what
constitutes an injury, what injury is sufficient and which plaintiff
should assert it over the threshold and into the case without pro-
viding any guidance as to how to resolve these questions.
A third alternative attempts to broaden the concept of an injury
sufficient to sustain standing to include either "(1) a concrete in-
jury that is arguably within the zone of interests to be protected or
regulated by the statute or constitutional provision alleged to be
violated, or (2) an injury of the type contemplated by the provision
in question" even if the injury is speculative, indirect or intangi-
ble. 1 This proposal moves in the right direction by recognizing
that violation of some laws and constitutional guarantees will pro-
duce concrete injuries, while violation of others will not. If a plain-
tiff suffers a concrete injury, he basically is covered by existing
standing rules. For these plaintiffs, the proposal urges a liberal in-
terpretation of "arguably within the zone of interests" protected so
that the injured plaintiff "need not show conclusively that it [in-
jury] was intended to be protected against by the violated statute
or provision, rather he need only make a plausible argument on the
point." 2 On the other hand, a plaintiff suffering an intangible
harm would be required to show clear statutory or constitutional
108. Comment, supra note 92, at 143-48. This proposal draws on the theories of Profes-
sor Albert. See Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Sur-
rogate for Claim for Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425 (1974).
109. See Ass'n of Data Processing Serv. Org. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970). In aban-
doning the legal interest test for standing, the Court stated: "The 'legal interest' test goes to
the merits. The question of standing is different." Id.
110. Comment, supra note 92, at 146.
111. Comment, supra note 17, at 234.
112. Id. at 231.
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intent to protect an asserted interest because the question becomes
whether the plaintiff has suffered any injury at all.1 3 This proposal
would have allowed standing in Richardson' 4 and Schlesinger' 5
under the second part of the test, for although violation of the con-
stitutional clauses involved produces indefinite injuries, the provi-
sions appear to protect against them.
A similar proposal that produces somewhat different results has
been advanced by Professor Bogen." 6 This proposal moves further
away from focusing on the plaintiff's asserted injury and empha-
sizes examination of the constitutional provision underlying a
claim to determine who would be the "better plaintiff" to make the
claim. If governmental action produces a "non-political" in-
jury-one which causes specific harm to a person or his prop-
erty-then the injured person would be the proper party to assert
the claim and would have standing. This is because where a spe-
cific injury exists, the courts are not likely to take the challenges of
uninjured parties seriously and because suits by uninjured parties
may interfere with the injured plaintiff's claim through the doc-
trine of stare decisis. 117
However, if governmental action produces a non-specific "politi-
cal" injury, the better plaintiff would be determined according to
the underlying constitutional provision. If the provision expressly
prohibits harm to an individual, then the individual who suffers
that harm is the best plaintiff and should be found to have stand-
ing. ' 8 If the provision relates to the distribution of powers be-
tween state and federal governments, then the governmental body
affected, rather than citizens or taxpayers, would be the better
plaintiff." 9 If the provision is directed at preserving the integrity
of government itself by, for example, requiring minimum ages,
prohibiting conflicts of interest or limiting terms in office, then af-
fected individuals who can force a confrontation under these
clauses should be granted standing.'2 0 If the provision is intended
to protect minorities from the tyranny of the majority, then minor-
ities specifically harmed or taxpayers forced to pay in violation of
113. Id. at 231-32.
114. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
115. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
116. Bogen, supra note 77.
117. Id. at 153-54.
118. Id. at 163.
119. Id. at 163-65.
120. Id. at 165-69.
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the guarantee should be given standing."'1
While this proposal does the best job of identifying the better
plaintiff to assert various claims and would appear to allow stand-
ing to Americans United, it does not go far enough in allowing
challenges to violations of constitutional provisions designed to
preserve the integrity of the governmental system. It may be possi-
ble for certain individuals to force a confrontation with govern-
mental officials sufficient to obtain standing. For example, an un-
derage candidate can sue election officials for refusing to put his
name on the ballot. However, too often it may not be possible to
force a confrontation. This proposal essentially denies standing to
citizens seeking to force their government to operate according to
the processes specified by its Constitution and relies on the execu-
tive and legislative branches to check each other through the polit-
ical process. Thus, standing still would be denied in Richardson'2
and Schlesinger2 3 situations. 2 4
The best standing alternative would be an extension of the
Bogen proposal. Plaintiffs who have suffered a specific injury are
generally granted access to the courts under existing standing
rules. Since all citizens are, in effect, injured by the non-specific
harms produced by violation of many constitutional provisions, re-
sort to Bogen's "better plaintiff" rule to determine which plaintiff
should sue is appropriate. However, the rule should be further ex-
panded to allow citizen suits to enforce the constitutional integrity
of government itself. Bogen's argument against this rests primarily
on the difficulty of fashioning a judicial remedy for the alleged vio-
lation.'25 For example, Justice Black, while a congressman, voted
to establish pensions for the Supreme Court. After his appoint-
ment, a citizen sued 26 for an alleged violation of article I, section
6, clause 2 prohibiting the appointmept of any senator or represen-
tative to an office for which the salary was increased during the
121. Id. at 169-70.
122. See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 21-22 and accompanying text.
124. It should be noted that denying citizens access to the courts to enforce constitu-
tional provisions does not necessarily leave the would-be plaintiffs without any alternative
course of action. Through exercise of first amendment free-speech and free-press rights, citi-
zens have been able to influence both the political and judicial process. For a discussion of
this alternative, see Blasi, The Checking Value in First Amendment Theory, 1977 A.B.F.
RESEARCH J. 521.
125. Bogen, supra note 77 at 168-69. Bogen also argues that if citizens are allowed to sue
on governmental integrity provisions, the Court may begin drawing lines between acceptable
and unacceptable activity, thereby encouraging activity close to the line. Id. at 169.
126. Ex parte Levitt, 302 U.S. 633 (1937).
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elected official's terms in Congress. The Court held that the plain-
tiff did not have standing to assert the claim. If the Court had
taken the case, Bogen questions whether it could have made an
adequate choice among the various possible remedies. These reme-
dies included barring Justice Black from participating in further
decisions and from drawing salary, invalidating the pension en-
tirely or only as to Justice Black, setting all the cases in which he
participated for reargument or only those in which his vote was the
deciding factor, imposing a temporary bar until the legislature's
next session, or holding the appointment to be constitutional. In-
ability to fashion an adequate remedy may be a genuine problem
in some, but not all of these cases. The solution in Richardson
would not have been so difficult; the Court could have resolved the
problem there simply by requiring the executive department to re-
veal expenditures of the Central Intelligence Agency as the Consti-
tution appears to require. In Schlesinger, the solution of requiring
congressmen to relinquish their Army Reserve commissions ap-
pears equally simple. In the cases where an adequate remedy can-
not be fashioned, the Court, as noted by Professor Davis, can al-
ways resort to other doctrines, such as political question. The
better plaintiff to assert violations of constitutional provisions pre-
serving governmental integrity may be citizen groups such as
Americans United, Reservists Committee to Stop the War or Si-
erra Club. Their standing could be decided on the basis of motiva-
tion, demonstrated ability to fully and adversely litigate the issues
and financial resources to pursue cases to their ultimate resolution.
VII. CONCLUSION
Critics of the Court's current standing doctrine correctly point
out that the injury-in-fact requirement is an artificial and easily
manipulated standard that does not guarantee adversity or full
resolution of the issues. It allows the Court to make decisions on
the merits of claims without saying so. Further, the doctrine too
often becomes a bar to plaintiffs seeking to vindicate important
constitutional guarantees.
The mechanical application of the Flast test in Americans
United and the Court's refusal to consider citizen standing indi-
cate how rigid the Court has become in approaching its responsi-
bility of maintaining our constitutional system of checks and bal-
ances against governmental excesses. As the alternate standing
19821
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proposals demonstrate, a simpler, more flexible and more reasona-
ble standing doctrine is within reach.
